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2. Id. at 481.
3. Id. at 476.
4. The sculptural version was made of polychromed wood,
which consists of wood sculpture painted different colors with
oil paints.
5. 751F. Supp. at 476.
6. Id. at 477.
7. Id. at 477.
8. Id.
9. The court relied on the Second Circuit decision in Falk
v. T.P. Howell & Co., 37 F.Supp. 202 (S.D.NY 1888).
10. 751 F.Supp. at 477. The court relied on the decision in
Falk as well as the Second Circuit decision in King Features
Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533 (2d Cir. 1924), for this propo-
sition.
11. 751 F. Supp. at 477.
12. Quoting the Second Circuit opinion in Ideal 'Thy Co. v.
Fab-Lu Ltd., the court asserted that the appropriate test of
substantial similarity is "whether an average lay observer
would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated
from the copyrighted work."' Id. at 478, citing Ideal Toy Co. v.
Fab-Lu Ltd., 360F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966).
13. 751 F.Supp. at 478.
14. Id. at 479.
15. Id. at 479-480.
16. Id. at 480, citing Stewart v. Abend, 110 S.Ct. 1750, 1769
(1990).
17. The Ninth Circuit in Stewart concluded that re-release
of the film version of the original copyrighted story from which
it was based adversely affected the ability to market new ver-
sions of the story. 110 S.Ct. at 1769.
18. 751 F. Supp. at 480.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 481, quoting Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Colum-
bia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
22. 751 F. Supp. at 480.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 478, citingKingFeatures Syndicate, 299 F. at 536.
25. Id. at 478, citingKingFeatures Syndicate, 299 F. at 535.
Weller v. American
Broadcasting Companies, Inc.,
283 Cal. Rptr. 644 (Cal.Ct. App. 1991).
Introduction
The plaintiff, an antique silver dealer, filed a defa-
mation action against the defendants, a television
broadcasting company, a local station, and a re-
porter, for a broadcast concerning the origin and
value of an antique silver candelabra. A Marin
County Superior Court jury found the broadcast
defamatory and awarded the plaintiff $2.3 million
in damages. In affirming the superior court's hold-
ing, the California Court of Appeals held that the
broadcast could be understood as implying defama-
tory facts, and such facts were provable falsities.
Facts
In 1982, the plaintiff acquired two antique silver
candelabra from a wealthy Texas family. After re-
pairing the candelabra, the plaintiff sold them to
the deYoung Museum in 1983 for $65,000. The
museum was apprised of the repairs to the cande-
labra. About a year later, one of the defendants, the
local television station, received a telephone call
from a confidential source suggesting the candela-
bra purchased by the museum was overpriced and
did not originate from the Texas family, but rather
from a well-known San Francisco sculptress'home.
About this same time, Jerry Durham was convicted
of insurance fraud involving silver and was sus-
pected of stealing the candelabra in question from
the sculptress' home.
The television station proceeded to air a series of
short features on its regular nightly news program
on the subject of the candelabra. The first broadcast
was entitled, "Antique Fraud." The broadcast con-
cerning the deYoung candelabra was entitled, 'Mu-
seum Fraud?" The plaintiff contended that the
broadcasts implied the following defamatory facts:
(1) the plaintiff sold to the museum a stolen cande-
labra at an inflated price; (2) he misrepresented the
origin, condition, and maker of the candelabra; (3)
he was an associate of the convicted Jerry Durham;
(4) he inadequately repaired the candelabra and did
not inform the museum; and, (5) he generally de-
frauded the museum.
Ajury trial found the defendants guilty of defama-
tion and awarded the plaintiff general damages
totaling $2.3 million. The jury determined that an
average viewer would understand the broadcasts to
make one or more defamatory statements and
these implied statements were false. Moreover, the
jury found that the defendant/reporter made one or
more of the statements with knowledge that the
statements were false or with reckless disregard for
the truth.
Legal Analysis
The issue faced by the California Court of Appeals
was whether specific statements could be excluded
from evidence because they constituted an opinion
and were therefore constitutionally protected. In
sustaining the trial court's admission of the state-
ments, the court noted that the United States Su-
preme Court recently held there is no separate
constitutional privilege protecting opinions.' In
other words, there is no "wholesale defamation
exemption" for a statement labeled an opinion.2 In
fact, the Supreme Court reasoned that an opinion
often implies an assertion of an objective fact,
Spring 1992 52
1
Brown: Weller v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. 283 Cal. Rptr. 64
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
thereby subjecting the statement to a defamation
analysis. Statements that are false are not pro-
tected.3 Nonetheless, courts are still admonished to
protect statements that cannot reasonably be inter-
preted as stating actual facts, and as such are those
statements classified as satirical, hyperbolic,
imaginative, or rhetorical. 4 Therefore, the Califor-
nia court found that opinions, such as the broadcast
statements in question, were not absolutely privi-
leged.
Once the court determined that the statements
may not be protected, the defendants contended the
broadcast statements should still be excluded from
jury consideration because no reasonable juror
could conclude these statements implied defama-
tory facts. Under constitutional analysis, a state-
ment is defamatory if it expressly or impliedly
asserts a fact that is susceptible to being proved
false, and the language and tenor of the statement
can reasonably be interpreted as asserting actual
facts.5 Additionally, if statements are susceptible to
both an innocent and libelous meaning, it is up to
the jury to decide how the fact should be under-
stood, even if the defendant has made qualifying
statements regarding the accuracy of the fact.6
The court found that the broadcasts could be under-
stood as implying defamatory statements. The
court concluded the statements were implicitly de-
famatory because the defendants insisted on link-
ing the plaintiff with the convicted felon, Jerry
Durham, while consistently alluding to the cande-
labra as being stolen property sold at an inflated
price. Moreover, the broadcasts could be defama-
tory because the defendant/reporter continually as-
serted that her efforts to obtain information from
the plaintiff and the museum were being "stone-
walled," thereby alluding that the plaintiff and
museum had something to hide. Therefore, the
court held there was no error in submitting these
statements to a jury for determination.
Next, the court needed to determine whether the
"context and tenor" of the statements negated the
impression that the defamatory statements were
assertions of actual fact. "If a defendant juxtaposes
[a] series of facts so as to imply a defamatory
connection between them, or [otherwise] creates a
defamatory implication... he may be held respon-
sible for the defamatory implication.., even if the
particular facts are correct."" In other words, it is
the implication of the statements, not the state-
ments themselves, which must be examined to de-
termine whether the statements are entitled to
constitutional protection.8 Finally, couching a
statement in interrogatory language does not enti-
tle it to constitutional protection.9
The defendants contended that the speculative for-
mat of the features, coupled with cautionary lan-
guage, negated any impression that the reports
implied actual facts. In rejecting this position, the
court determined that unlike hyperbole or satire,
defamatory statements made in the context of a
generally accepted notion that a news broadcast is
objective and neutral is almost certain to give rise
to a viewer believing the statements to be actual
fact. The court then rejected the notion that placing
the defamatory fact in cautionary language, or put-
ting it in the form of a question, necessarily defused
the impression that the statement is an actual fact.
Last, the court needed to determine whether some
of the implied defamatory facts were false. An in-
quiry into whether a defamatory statement is false
requires the plaintiff to prove that the statement
was substantially false; not whether the defen-
dants knew or could have known at the time the
statement was made that it was false.10 In finding
that the alleged defamatory fact, the true value of
the candelabra, was a verifiable fact, the court
rejected the defendants' contention that finding
such a valuation for the candelabra was an inexact
science because the experts would reach varying
conclusions as to the candelabra's value. The court
reasoned the only concern was whether the fact
could be objectively verified. Therefore, a range of
reasonable valuation of the candelabra, which cov-
ered the plaintiffs sale price, was found by the
court to be an objective verification. Additionally,
the court found that the origin of the candelabra
asserted by the defendants was a fact that was
either true or false and could be proved in court by
the plaintiff.
Conclusion
In finding that the alleged defamatory statements
were correctly submitted to the jury for considera-
tion, the California Court of Appeals cautioned that
had the defendants' arguments prevailed, "similar
false broadcasts would be protected without regard
to the degree of fault involved in their publication
and without regard to [a] plaintiffs status as a
private individual."" However, as a final note, this
court emphasized that it is still unclear what im-
pact the Milkovich decision will have on state defa-
mation laws in light of prior defamation laws which
distinguish between opinion and fact. 9
Karen R. Brown
1. Weller v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 283
Cal. Rptr. 644,649 (Ca. Ct. App. 1991), citingMilkovichv. Lorain
Journal Co., 110 S.Ct. 2695 (1990).
2. 110 S.Ct. at 2705.
53 Journal of Art & Entertainment Law
2
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 6
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol2/iss2/6
